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Abstract
We present a revealed preference methodology for nonparametric demand anal-
ysis under the assumption of normal goods. Our methodology is flexible in that
it allows for imposing normality on any subset of goods. We show the usefulness
of our methodology for empirical welfare analysis through cost of living indices.
An illustration to US consumption data drawn from the Panel Study of Income
Dynamics (PSID) demonstrates that mild normality assumptions can substantially
strengthen the empirical analysis. It obtains considerably tighter bounds on cost of
living indices, and a significantly more informative classification of better-off and
worse-off individuals after the 2008 financial crisis.
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1 Introduction
Changing price-income regimes can have a substantive impact on individual demand pat-
terns. The empirical analysis of the associated welfare effects has attracted considerable
attention in the applied welfare literature. In the current paper, we propose a structural
method for such welfare analysis that is intrinsically nonparametric: it does not impose
any parametric/functional structure on the individual utilities, but merely exploits the
preference information that is directly revealed by the observed consumption behavior.
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Particularly, we demonstrate that mild normality assumptions on the demand for (a sub-
set of) goods can obtain a significantly informative analysis of individual cost of living
indices. We show this through an empirical illustration to household demand data taken
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID), in which we analyze the welfare effects
of the 2008 financial crisis for a sample of singles in the US.
Welfare evaluation and counterfactual demand analysis. The structural analy-
sis of welfare effects associated with changing prices and/or incomes requires predicting
demand in counterfactual price-income regimes. This issue is standardly addressed by
adopting a parametric approach, which assumes a specific functional form for the con-
sumers’ utility or expenditure functions.1 The parameters of this functional form are
then estimated from the observed consumption behavior, and these estimations can be
used to interpolate or extrapolate demand in unobserved price-income situations. A main
problem of this parametric approach is that it crucially relies on some a priori assumed
functional form for the individual preferences, which is typically non-verifiable. This
implies an intrinsic risk of specification error.
We can avoid this specification risk by adopting the nonparametric revealed pref-
erence approach that was initiated by Samuelson (1938) and Houthakker (1950), and
further developed by Afriat (1967), Diewert (1973) and Varian (1982). Basically, this
nonparametric approach develops testable implications for observed consumption pat-
terns (prices and quantities) that must hold under rational demand behavior associated
with any well-behaved utility function. These testable implications are then used as a
basis for counterfactual demand predictions in the form of set identification (producing
bounds on possible demand responses in new price-income regimes). By its very nature,
this nonparametric approach avoids the possibility of erroneous conclusions following
from a wrongly specified functional form.
Revealed preference analysis and normal goods. Although this nonparametric
orientation of the revealed preference approach is conceptually appealing, its empirical
usefulness is often put into question. Generally, an informative empirical analysis requires
a rich data set with high price variation and low income variation. In many observational
settings, however, the opposite holds true (i.e., low price variation combined with high
income variation). In such cases, the nonparametric testable implications have little
empirical bite and, correspondingly, the set identification results are not very informative
(see, for example, Varian (1982) and Bronars (1987) for detailed discussions). As an
implication, the revealed preference methodology is then of limited practical value.
In the current paper, we show that this lack of power can be remediated by assuming
normality of the goods that are consumed. Normality is often a natural assumption to
make. Basically, a good is normal if its income expansion path is increasing. A convenient
feature of our method is that we can impose normality without needing to estimate the
expansion path; our nonparametric testable implications apply to any expansion path
that satisfies normal demand. Moreover, our method applies to settings with any number
of goods, and can impose normality on any subset of these goods. The only assumption it
makes is that normality holds for the observed prices, so avoiding the stronger hypothesis
1Popular functional forms in the literature are the Cobb-Douglas, the translog (Christensen, Jorgen-
son, and Lau, 1975), the almost ideal demand (Deaton and Muellbauer (1980)) and quadratic almost
ideal demand specification (Banks, Blundell, and Lewbel (1997)).
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that normality must apply to any (observed or unobserved) price.2
In a recent series of papers, Blundell, Browning, and Crawford (2003, 2007, 2008) and
Blundell, Browning, Cherchye, Crawford, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2015) also used the
assumption of normal demand for observed prices to deal with the power issue associated
with empirical revealed preference analysis. However, we see at least two main differences
between the method proposed by these authors and our novel method. First, they assume
that normality holds for all goods simultaneously, whereas our method is equally appli-
cable to normality for any subset of goods. Second, and more importantly, these authors
exploit normality of demand by using (nonparametrically) estimated income expansion
paths (assuming a repeated cross-sectional data set). As indicated above, our method
avoids this prior estimation step (and associated statistical issues); it directly applies re-
vealed preference restrictions (for normal demand) to the observed consumption choices.
Interestingly, our empirical application shows that our method can yield an informative
welfare analysis even with a short time series of (three) consumption observations per
individual.
Empirical welfare analysis and cost of living indices. We show that our revealed
preference method can be used for a meaningful welfare analysis on the basis of cost of
living indices. We demonstrate this through an empirical application to data drawn from
the PSID. We select a balanced panel from the 2007, 2009 and 2011 waves of the PSID
to study the welfare effects of the 2008 financial crisis. A large number of studies has
analyzed these welfare effects since the onset of the crisis. As the crisis led to a substantial
rise in unemployment, the principal focus so far has been on the extensive margin of
labor supply (see, for example, Verick (2009); Hurd and Rohwedder (2010); Goodman
and Mance (2011); Deaton (2011)). By contrast, in our application we concentrate on
individuals who remained employed after the crisis.
More specifically, our structural analysis assumes a model of rational labor supply
for singles who spend their potential income on leisure, food, housing and other goods,
hereby imposing normality on all consumption categories except from leisure. To assess
the empirical bite of the testable implications associated with normality, we also compute
the empirical results for the rational labor supply model without normal demand. Our
results show that imposing normality entails a substantially more powerful empirical
analysis. In particular, we obtain considerably tighter bounds on cost of living indices,
and a significantly more informative classification of better-off and worse-off individuals
after the 2008 crisis.
Outline. Section 2 develops the revealed preference characterization of utility maxi-
mization under normality assumptions. Section 3 introduces the cost of living index for
our empirical welfare analysis, and defines the goodness-of-fit measure that we will use to
evaluate the empirical fit of our normality assumptions. Section 4 presents our empirical
application to PSID data. Section 5 concludes.
2See Cherchye, Demuynck, and De Rock (2018) for a discussion of the nonparametrically testable
implications of normal demand under any (observed or unobserved) price, with a main focus on the
specific demand setting with two consumed goods.
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2 Rational demand with normal goods
Our main theoretical result defines the testable implications for the observed demand
behavior to be consistent with rationality (i.e., utility maximization) and normality of (a
subset of) the consumed goods. To this end, we first define the Generalized Axiom of
Revealed Preference (GARP) in terms of Hicksian demand bundles that correspond to the
observed prices and associated utility levels (for the given quantity bundles). Imposing
normality boils down to restricting these Hicksian demand bundles at any observed price
regime to be monotone in utility (Fisher, 1990). Basically, our testable revealed preference
conditions verify whether there exists at least one possible specification of the utility levels
and Hicksian demand bundles that satisfy this requirement. If so, we cannot reject the
joint hypothesis of normality and rational behavior.
Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP). Throughout, we focus on
a finite set T of observed prices and corresponding quantities. For each consumption
observation t ∈ T , let qt ∈ Rn+ and pt ∈ Rn++ denote the (column) vectors of quantities
and prices, respectively. This defines the data set S = {(pt, qt)}t∈T . We say that S
is “rationalizable” if there exists a utility function u(.) such that, for each observation
t ∈ T , qt maximizes this function u(.) over all affordable bundles for the given prices pt
and outlay xt = ptqt. Throughout, we will assume utility functions that are continuous
and strictly monotone.
Definition 1 A data set S = {(pt, qt)}t∈T is rationalizable if there exists a continuous
and strictly monotone utility function u : Rn+ → R such that, for all t ∈ T and xt = ptqt,
qt ∈ arg maxu(q) s.t. ptq ≤ xt.
Varian (1982) has shown that the Generalized Axiom of Revealed Preference (GARP)
defines a necessary and sufficient condition for a data set S to be rationalizable. Thus,
checking rationalizability boils down to verifying whether or not the set S satisfies GARP.
To formally define this GARP requirement, we will need the following concepts.
Definition 2 Consider a data set S = {(pt, qt)}t∈T . We say that qt, t ∈ T , is directly
revealed preferred to the bundle qv, v ∈ T , if ptqt ≥ ptqv. We denote this as qtRDqv.
Next, we say that qt is strictly directly revealed preferred to qv if ptqt > ptqv. We denote
this as qtP
Dqv. Finally, we say that qt is revealed preferred to qv if there exists a (possibly
empty) sequence u, s, · · · , r ∈ T such that
qtR
Dqu, quR
Dqs, . . . , qrR
Dqv.
We denote this as qtRqv.
Thus, the quantity bundle qt is directly revealed preferred to the bundle qv (i.e.,
qtR
Dqv) if qv was affordable when bundle qt was chosen (i.e., ptqt ≥ ptqv). If the inequality
is strict (i.e., ptqt > ptqv), then qt is strictly directly revealed preferred to qv (i.e., qtP
Dqv).
Finally, from the direct revealed preference relations, we can define the more general
concept of (direct or indirect) revealed preference relations by exploiting transitivity of
preferences (i.e., qtRqv follows from qtR
Dqu, quR
Dqs, . . . , qrR
Dqv).
We can now define GARP.
4
Definition 3 A data set S = {(pt, qt)}t∈T satisfies GARP if, for all t, v ∈ T , qtRqv
implies not qvP
Dqt.
In words, a data set S satisfies GARP if, for any two observed bundles qt and qv,
qtRqv implies that qv is not strictly directly revealed preferred to qt (i.e., not qvP
Dqt).
Intuitively, GARP excludes that bundle qt is revealed preferred to qv while, at the same
time, qt was affordable at a strictly lower cost when qv was purchased.
In what follows, we will focus on a less standard reformulation of the GARP condition
in Definition 3. This alternative formulation will be instrumental for our characterization
of rationalizable consumer behavior under normal demand. It is contained in the following
result.3
Proposition 1 A data set S = {(pt, qt)}t∈T satisfies GARP if and only if there exist
numbers (ut)t∈T such that, for all s, t ∈ T ,
• if ut ≥ us, then psqs ≤ psqt,
• if ut > us, then psqs < psqt.
Thus, rationalizability of a data set S can be verified by checking the existence of “utility
numbers” ut that satisfy a series of “if–then” conditions. Intuitively, each number ut
represents the consumer’s utility level associated with the bundle qt. If the utility level at
observation t is (strictly) above the utility level at observation s (i.e., ut ≥ (>)us), then
the bundle qt must be (strictly) more expensive than the bundle qs at the prices ps.
Normality-extended GARP (N-GARP) Let M ⊆ {1, ..., n} be a subset of the
goods that are consumed. We say that a data set S is rationalizable by normal demand
on the subset M if there exists a well behaved utility function that (1) represents each
observed bundle qt as utility maximizing under (2) the additional requirement that, for
each good i ∈M , the income expansion path at the observed prices has a positive slope.
Formally, we have the following definition.
Definition 4 A data set S = {(pt, qt)}t∈T is rationalizable by normal demand on the
subset M (M ⊆ {1, ..., n}) if there exists a continuous and strictly monotone utility
function u : Rn+ → R and functions qt : R+ → Rn+ such that, for all t ∈ T and xt = ptqt,
• qt(x) ∈ arg maxu(q) s.t. ptq ≤ x,
• qit(x) is strictly monotone in x for all i ∈M ,
• qt = qt(xt).
In this definition, the function qt(.) represents the income expansion path at the observed
prices pt, defining the quantities demanded by the consumer at the price-income pair
(pt, x) for any value of x. Definition 4 defines three conditions for the functions u(.)
and qt(.). The first condition states that, for all income levels x, qt(x) maximizes the
function u(.) over all affordable bundles at prices pt and income x. The second condition
imposes that qit(x) is increasing in x, meaning that good i ∈ M is normal at prices pt.
3This equivalent reformulation of GARP has been used in the literature on nonparametric production
analysis. We refer to Varian (1984) (Theorem 2) for a formal proof of Proposition 1.
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The last condition requires that qt(xt) equals the observed demand qt for the observed
income/outlay xt (= ptqt) and prices pt.
We next establish the revealed preference characterization of rationalizable behavior
as defined in Definition 4. This provides nonparametric testable implications for the
observed data set S to be by consistent with utility maximization under the additional
assumption of normal demand. In particular, we can show that rationalizability under
normal demand holds if and only if the data set S satisfies the normality-extended GARP
(N-GARP).
Definition 5 For M ⊆ {1, ..., n}, a data set S = {(pt, qt)}t∈T satisfies N-GARP if there
exist numbers (ut)t∈T and vectors (qt,v)t,v∈T (qt,v ∈ Rn+) such that, for all r, s, t, v ∈ T ,
• qt,t = qt,
• if ut ≥ uv, then prqr,v ≤ prqs,t,
• if ut > uv, then prqr,v < prqs,t,
• if ut ≥ uv, then qir,v ≤ qir,t for all i ∈M.
The following proposition contains our main theoretical result.4
Proposition 2 A data set S = {(pt, qt)}t∈T is rationalizable by normal demand on the
subset M (M ⊆ {1, ..., n}) if and only if it satisfies N-GARP.
Similar to Proposition 1, we obtain that rationalizability imposes the existence of
utility numbers ut that satisfy a series of if-then conditions. In our N-GARP definition,
each vector qt,v represents the Hicksian demand bundle at prices pt for the utility level
associated with the bundle qv (captured by the number uv). Rationalizability requires the
numbers ut and vectors qt,v to satisfy the four conditions in Definition 5. The first condi-
tion states, for each observation t ∈ T , that the Hicksian demand qt,t at the given prices
(pt) and utility level (ut) must equal the observed Marshallian demand qt. The second
and third condition impose GARP (as formulated in Lemma 1) on the sets (pt, qt,v)t,v∈T ,
which consist of observed prices pt and Hicksian demand vectors qt,v. The final condition
requires that the Hicksian quantities for each good i ∈ M are monotonically increasing
in utility, which corresponds to normal demand (Fisher, 1990).
When comparing the conditions in Proposition 1 with those in Definition 5, it is clear
that N-GARP generally implies stronger rationalizability requirements than GARP. N-
GARP reduces to GARP (only) in the limiting case that does not impose normality for
any good. We illustrate the difference between N-GARP and GARP in Example 1, which
contains a data set that satisfies GARP but violates N-GARP. It indicates that imposing
normality can yield a more powerful revealed preference analysis. This is an attractive
feature, as normality assumptions are often little debatable and thus easy to make.
Finally, in Appendix B we show that the N-GARP condition in Definition 5 can be
reformulated in terms of inequality constraints that are linear in unknowns and char-
acterized by (binary) integer variables. These linear inequality constraints are easily
operationalized, which is convenient from an application point of view.5
4Appendix A contains the proof of Proposition 2.
5For example, we used the software package IBM ILOG CPLEX Optimization Studio for our empirical
application in Section 4. Our CPLEX codes are available upon request.
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Figure 1: Example data set that violates N-GARP but not GARP
Example 1. We illustrate the difference between N-GARP and GARP by means of a
simple numerical example using a data set S with two goods (n = 2) and two observations
(T = {1, 2}):
p1 =
[
4
4
]
, p2 =
[
3
5
]
, q1 =
[
8
1
]
, q2 =
[
4
10
]
.
Figure 1 depicts the two quantity bundles and associated budget sets. From this figure,
it is easy to verify that the set S satisfies GARP. In particular, the budget lines do not
cross, which automatically implies consistency with GARP. More formally, referring to
Proposition 1, we have p1q1 = 36, p1q2 = 56, p2q1 = 29 and p2q2 = 62. Then, using
u1 = 0.1 and u2 = 0.2 obtains that all conditions in Proposition 1 are satisfied.
Next, we can show that the same data set S violates N-GARP forM = {1, 2}, i.e. both
goods are assumed to be normal goods. In particular, we prove that there do not exist
numbers u1, u2 and vectors q1,1, q1,2, q2,1, q2,2 that simultaneously meet the four conditions
in Definition 5. To see this, we begin by noting that the first N-GARP condition imposes
q1,1 = q1 =
[
8
1
]
, and q2,2 = q2 =
[
4
10
]
. (1)
In addition, the second N-GARP condition (using that u2 ≥ u2) imposes
p1q1,2 ≤ p1q2,2 and p2q2,2 ≤ p2q1,2. (2)
Combining (1) and (2) obtains (using superscripts to indicate the quantities of goods 1
and 2)
4q11,2 + 4q
2
1,2 ≤ 56,
62 ≤ 3q11,2 + 5q21,2.
These two inequalities together imply
62 ≤ 3q11,2 + 5q21,2 ≤ 3q11,2 + 5(14− q11,2) ⇔ q11,2 ≤ 4. (3)
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On the other hand, because p1q1,1 = 36 < p1q2,2 = 56, the third N-GARP condition in
Proposition 5 requires
u1 < u2.
Then, the fourth N-GARP condition imposes (using that goods 1 and 2 are both normal)
q1,1 ≤ q1,2.
Combined with (1), this entails
q11,2 ≥ 8,
which contradicts (3). Thus, we conclude that N-GARP is violated.
We can also graphically illustrate this N-GARP violation in Figure 1. To see this,
we first note that the Hicksian demand q1,2 should lie below the dashed line associated
with the budget p1q2. Also, if both goods are normal at the prices p1, it must hold that
q1,2 contains more of both goods 1 and 2 than q1 (i.e., q1,2 ≥ q1). Taken together, we
conclude that q1,2 is situated in the triangular region formed by the thick-dashed lines.
Then, the conclusion that N-GARP is violated follows from the observation that no q1,2
in this region is consistent with rationalizability of the consumption observation (p2, q2).
Specifically, any such q1,2 is strictly less expensive than the bundle q2 at prices p2. As an
implication, for the outlay p2q2 and prices p2 associated with the quantity bundle q2, the
consumer could have chosen bundles strictly better than q1,2. This implies that q1,2 and
q2 cannot yield the same utility value for a strictly monotone utility function.
3 Cost of living and goodness-of-fit
In this section, we introduce some additional concepts and tools that will be useful
for our following application. First, we show how our testable conditions for normal
demand can be used to identify cost of living indices for comparing individual welfare
in alternative price-income regimes. Next, in their original formulation, our revealed
preference conditions for rational behavior under normal demand define “exact” tests:
data either satisfy the requirements or not. In our empirical application, we will use an
Afriat type Critical Cost Efficiency Index (CCEI) to assess how closely behavior complies
with rational behavior. This index will serve as a goodness-of-fit measure that has a
specific interpretation as capturing the economic significance of violations of our testable
implications.
Cost of living indices. An important application of empirical demand analysis con-
sists of comparing consumers’ welfare in alternative price-income regimes. More specif-
ically, for two consumption observations (pt, qt) and (pr, qr), we not only wish to know
which combination is (revealed) “better” by the consumer, but also “how much better”.
As utility theory is ordinal in nature, there is no unique answer to this last question.
A popular method makes use of the money metric utility concept that was introduced
by Samuelson (1974). In what follows, we will use this money metric representation of
individual utility to compute cost of living indices associated with different price-income
situations. Technically, we adapt the nonparametric method that was developed by Var-
ian (1982), based on the GARP concept in Definition 3.6 We will show that our N-GARP
6Varian (1982) refers to the money metric utility function as income compensation function. He
considers welfare comparisons between price-income situations that are possibly unobserved. In the
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characterization in Definition 5 easily allows for computing lower and upper bounds on
individuals’ cost of living indices. This effectively set identifies these indices using the
assumption of rationalizability under normal demand.
The money metric utility function gives the minimum expenditure required in obser-
vation t (with price-income pair (pt, xt)) to attain the same utility level as under some
reference price-income regime (pr, xr). Formally, it is defined as
µ(pt; pr, xr) ≡ e(pt, v(pr, xr)),
with e(p, u) the expenditure function quantifying the minimum income required to attain
utility u at prices p, and v(p, x) the indirect utility function giving the maximum utility
level at prices p and income x. In our set-up, the vector qt,r represents Hicksian demand
at price pt and utility level ur, which itself equals v(pr, xr). Thus, we can simply write
µ(pt; pr, xr) = ptqt,r.
Then, using our N-GARP characterization of rationalizable consumer behavior under
normal demand, we can define upper (or lower) bounds on µ(pt; pr, xr) by maximizing
(or minimizing) ptqt,r subject to the conditions in Definition 5. This implies optimization
problems with a linear objective and linear inequality constraints that are characterized
by integer variables (see also Appendix B). It defines an interval set of possible values for
µ(pt; pr, xr) under the given normality assumptions.
In a following step, we can compare the welfare of some evaluated individual in con-
sumption observation t and reference observation r by using the cost of living index
ct,r =
xt − µ(pt; pr, xr)
xt
=
xt − ptqt,r
xt
.
In this expression, the numerator xt − µ(pt; pr, xr) defines the compensating variation
associated with the price change from pr to pt. It measures the difference between the
individual’s potential income in the decision situation t (i.e., xt) and the income needed by
the same individual under the prices pt to be equally well off as in the reference situation
r (i.e., µ(pt; pr, xr)). To obtain the cost of living index ct,r, we divide this compensating
variation by the available income in observation t. This compares the individual’s welfare
in t relative to r. If ct,r exceeds zero, the individual is better off in t than in r. Conversely,
if ct,r is below zero, the individual is worse off in t than in r.
Similar to before, our nonparametric characterization of rationalizable demand be-
havior allows us to nonparametrically identify upper and lower bounds on ct,r (using
set identification of µ(pt; pr, xr)). In our empirical application, we will conclude that
an individual is better off in situation t than in situation r if the lower bound of ct,r is
above zero. It means that any specification of the individual utilities that rationalizes
the observed consumption behavior entails a value for ct,r that exceeds zero. Similarly,
we can conclude that the individual is worse off in t than in r if the upper bound of ct,r is
below zero. Finally, if the lower and upper bounds have opposite signs, we cannot reject
the hypothesis that the individual is equally well off in both decision situations: we are
unable to robustly (i.e., for any specification of the rationalizing utilities) conclude that
the individual is better or worse off in t than in r.
current paper, our focus is on comparing observed price-income situations. Under specific assumptions
regarding unobserved prices, it is fairly easy to extend our following reasoning to welfare comparisons
that involve unobserved price-income regimes.
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Goodness-of-fit. The revealed preference characterization in Definition 5 allows us to
define sharp tests for rationalizable consumption behavior: either the data satisfy the
testable N-GARP conditions or they do not. When the data do not satisfy these exact
conditions, it is often interesting to empirically evaluate the degree of violation. For
example, it may happen that the data are close to satisfying the exact rationalizability
conditions, and we may want to include such almost rationalizable data in our further em-
pirical analysis. To this end, we extend Afriat (1973)’s notion of Critical Cost Efficiency
Index (CCEI) to our specific setting. Intuitively, the CCEI quantifies the goodness-of-fit
of the rationalizability conditions in terms of minimal adjustments of the observed expen-
diture levels that are needed to exclude violations of the nonparametric rationalizability
conditions. In other words, it quantifies the error that must be accounted for such that
the (corrected) data satisfy the rationality restrictions.7
Formally, to apply the CCEI concept to our N-GARP characterization, we introduce
a parameter e ∈ [0, 1]. Correspondingly, we adjust the last three (if–then) conditions in
Definition 5 for which r = v, while keeping the other conditions intact. That is, we only
change the conditions for which qr,v is equal to the observed bundle qv. This obtains the
following adapted conditions (for all r, s, t, v ∈ T ):
• if ut ≥ uv, then epvqv ≤ pvqs,t,
• if ut > uv, then epvqv < pvqs,t,
• if ut ≥ uv, then eqir,v ≤ qv,t for all i ∈M .
For a given data set S, the CCEI equals the highest value of e such that the con-
sumption observations satisfy these adjusted rationalizability conditions.8 Obviously,
higher CCEI-values signal a better fit of the rationalizability conditions. Next, as argued
by Apesteguia and Ballester (2015, Section V), the CCEI has two properties that are
specifically attractive from a practical point of view. First, it satisfies continuity, which
means that it never increases with the number of observations. Second, the CCEI sat-
isfies rationality, which implies that it equals one if and only if the data are (exactly)
rationalizable.
Let e∗ represent the CCEI of a given data set S. Then, we can define the adjusted
data set S∗ = (pt, e∗qt)t∈T which, by construction, satisfies the N-GARP restrictions in
Definition 5. For this adjusted set S∗, we can compute cost of living indices by using the
nonparametric procedure outlined above. In the following section, our main empirical
analysis will do so for the individuals with CCEI-values e∗ ≥ 0.99, which means that the
observed behavior is sufficiently close to rationalizability.
4 Illustrative application
To evaluate the welfare effects of the 2008 financial crises, we make use of a balanced
panel drawn from the 2007, 2009 and 2011 waves of the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
7The CCEI was originally introduced by Afriat (1973) and further developed by Varian (1990). Choi,
Kariv, Mu¨ller, and Silverman (2014) used the CCEI in a large scale field experiment as a measure of
consumers’ decision making quality. Intuitively, they interpret low CCEI-values as revealing optimization
errors arising from imperfect decision making quality. We may use a similar interpretation of the CCEI
results in our empirical application in Section 4. See also Apesteguia and Ballester (2015) and Halevy,
Persitz, and Zrill (2018) for related discussions.
8See Appendix B for more information concerning the computation of the CCEI.
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(PSID). By considering only three PSID waves, we can show that our methodology enables
an informative empirical analysis even for short time series of consumption observations.9
Moreover, it seems more reasonable to assume stable individual preferences over a shorter
time period. In Appendix D we demonstrate the robustness of our main qualitative
conclusions for a longer panel containing four consumption observations per individual
(adding the 2013 PSID wave to our original data set). This extra analysis also allows us
to study the impact of the crisis over a longer time period.
Data and set-up. The PSID, which was initiated in 1968, is a widely used survey
of a national representative sample of 18,000 individuals living in 5000 families in the
United States. The data set contains information on income, wealth, health, marriage,
childbearing, child development, education and other socio-demographic variables. Since
1999, the panel also provides additional expenditure information on a detailed set of
consumption categories (see Blundell, Pistaferri, and Saporta-Eksten (2016) for more
details).
Our empirical analysis specifically focuses on the welfare effects of the 2008 crisis for
singles (with and without children). Thus, we exclude couples from our investigation,
which also conveniently avoids preference aggregation issues associated with the welfare
analysis of multi-person households.10 We concentrate on individuals who are situated
on the intensive margin of labor supply, that is, our subjects are actively working on the
labor market in each period under study. We excluded the self-employed to avoid issues
regarding the imputation of wages and the separation of consumption from work-related
expenditures. After excluding observations with missing information (e.g. on wages,
labor hours or consumption expenditures), we end up with a sample of 821 individuals.
Table 4 in Appendix C reports summary statistics for our sample. We assume that in-
dividuals spend their full potential income on four consumption categories: food, housing,
leisure and other goods. We compute leisure quantities by assuming that each individual
needs 8 hours per day for personal care and sleep. Leisure equals the available time that
could have been spent on market work but was not (i.e., leisure per week = (24-8)*7
- market work). We calculate the individuals’ weekly expenditures (i.e., nominal dol-
lars per week) on the three remaining consumption categories (food, housing and other
goods) as the reported annual expenditures divided by 52. The price of leisure equals the
individual’s hourly wage for market work. The prices of food, housing and other goods
are region-specific consumer price indices that have been constructed by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics.
For our empirical analysis, we take it that the normality assumption is arguably
debatable for leisure. We only assume normality for the consumption categories food,
9In principle, it is possible to use our methodology with only two consumption observations per
individual. However, it can be shown that, in such a case, the N-GARP-based lower bounds on the cost
of living indices always equal the GARP-based lower bounds, by construction. Thus, by using three
consumption observations per individual, we can illustrate the usefulness of normality assumptions for
obtaining lower bounds that are more informative than the GARP-based bounds.
10Practical welfare analysis of multi-person households often adopts a unitary assumption, which
models these households as single decision makers. However, this unitary assumption has been rejected
by a large number of empirical studies (see, for example, Browning and Chiappori (1998) and Dauphin,
El Lahga, Fortin, and Lacroix (2011)). This suggests the extension of our analysis towards collective
household models, with multi-person households consisting of multiple decision makers, as an interesting
avenue of follow-up research. Such an extension can build on Cherchye, De Rock, and Vermeulen (2007,
2011), who developed the revealed preference characterization of rational consumption for collective
households.
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housing and other goods. We effectively do believe it plausible that these expenditures
are normal, all the more because they pertain to aggregate consumption categories. We
will conduct a goodness-of-fit analysis (using the CCEI) as well as a welfare analysis
(on the basis of cost of living indices) for the N-GARP condition associated with these
normality assumptions. We will compare these N-GARP-based results with the GARP-
based results that make no use of any normality assumption (recalling that N-GARP
reduces to GARP if no good is assumed to be normal). In Appendix D, we also present
a robustness check that considers the scenario in which all four consumption categories
are assumed to be normal. Evidently, stronger normality assumptions generally imply a
more powerful N-GARP-based analysis. Importantly, however, our principal qualitative
conclusions remain unaffected.
In our following exercises, we will conduct separate N-GARP-based and GARP-based
analyses for all 821 individuals that we observe. Using our notation of Section 2, this
defines a data set S with 3 observations (i.e., T = {2007, 2009, 2011}) and 4 goods (i.e.,
n = 4) for every single in our sample. By analyzing each individual separately, we fully
account for preference heterogeneity across individuals.
Goodness-of-fit. We begin by using Afriat’s Critical Cost Efficiency Index (CCEI)
to check data consistency with N-GARP and GARP for the sample of singles under
study. Basically, the GARP-based CCEI results reveal how well the assumption of utility
maximization fits the observed behavior, while the N-GARP-based CCEI results indicate
the empirical fit of our normality assumptions (for food, housing and other goods) in
addition to utility maximization. As explained in Section 3, the CCEI evaluates model
fit in terms of necessary adjustments of observed expenditures to obtain data consistency
with the (N-GARP and GARP) rationalizability conditions that are subject to evaluation.
CCEI-values are situated between zero and one, with higher values signaling a better fit.
Table 1 summarizes our CCEI results. The first row shows the number of individuals
who satisfy the exact N-GARP and GARP conditions (corresponding to CCEI = 1).
The second row reports the number of individuals who are very close to rationalizability
(characterized by CCEI ≥ 0.99). Generally, the CCEI-values for the N-GARP condition
are below the CCEI-values for the GARP condition. This should not be surprising
because, as explained above, the N-GARP condition is more stringent than the GARP
condition. Importantly, we find that the average CCEI-value is very high for N-GARP
as well as GARP: it equals 0.9912 for N-GARP and 0.9987 for GARP. However, we
also observe that the behavior of some individuals turns out to be quite far from exact
rationalizability. For example, the minimum CCEI-value equals 0.6774 for N-GARP and
0.7451 for GARP.
Overall, the results in Table 1 provide rather strong empirical support for N-GARP (as
well as GARP) applied to our sample of individuals. In most cases, we need only (very)
small expenditure adjustments to obtain consistency with the rationalizability conditions.
In our following welfare analysis, we will focus on the subsample of 702 individuals with
a N-GARP-based CCEI-value greater than or equal to 0.99. As explained above, such
a high CCEI-value signals behavior that is very close to exactly rationalizable, which
empirically motivates using the assumption of rationality (with normal demand) for our
welfare analysis. Appendix D contains a robustness analysis that only includes the 584
individuals of which the N-GARP-based CCEI-value equals 1 (i.e., exactly rationalizable
behavior). Comfortingly, this additional analysis yields the same main findings.
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Table 1: Critical Cost Efficiency Index (CCEI)
N-GARP GARP
CCEI = 1 584 (71.13%) 782 (95.25%)
CCEI ≥ 0.99 702 (85.51%) 803 (97.81%)
mean 0.9912 0.9987
std. dev. 0.0297 0.0124
min 0.6774 0.7451
25% 0.9980 1.0000
50% 1.0000 1.0000
75% 1.0000 1.0000
max 1.0000 1.0000
Cost of living indices. We quantify the welfare effects of the 2008 crisis by calculating
cost of living indices. For each individual in our sample, we estimate the difference in cost
of living between 2007 and 2011. More formally, we define this as the difference between
the actual income in 2011 and the income that would be required in the same year (at
2011 prices) to be equally well equally well off as in 2007:
c2011,2007 =
x2011 − p2011q2011,2007
x2011
,
We use the nonparametric set identification procedure outlined above. Particularly,
we compute GARP-based and N-GARP-based lower and upper bound on c2011,2007 by
using the rationalizability restrictions associated with GARP (in Definition 3) and N-
GARP (in Definition 5), respectively.
Table 2 gives a summary of our results for the sample of individuals under study.
Columns 2-3 summarize our N-GARP-based bounds and columns 5-6 our GARP-based
bounds. Correspondingly, ∆n in column 4 and ∆g in column 7 represent the differences
between the respective upper and lower bounds. Finally, column 8 reports on the relative
difference between ∆n and ∆g. This measures the extent to which the N-GARP-based
bounds are tighter than the GARP-based bounds. In a sense, it quantifies the identifying
power that specifically follows from our normality assumptions.
We observe that the N-GARP-based bounds are substantially tighter than the GARP-
based bounds. The mean (median) difference between the N-GARP-based lower and
upper bounds is 7.00 % (2.88%), which is much below the difference of 14.40% (9.36%)
between the GARP-based bounds. Moreover, the relative difference between ∆n and ∆g
amounts to no less than 50% for about half of our sample, again showing a significant
increase of identifying power when imposing normality.
As a following exercise, Figures 2 and 3 depict the empirical cumulative distribution
functions (CDFs) of our N-GARP-based and GARP-based lower and upper bounds for
c2011,2007. In line with our results in Table 2, the N-GARP-based CDFs are much closer to
each other than the GARP-based CDFs. From all this, we may safely conclude that our
(mild) normality assumptions do yield a considerably more informative welfare analysis.
Further inspection of Table 2 and Figures 2-3 reveals that, for our specific data, this
improvement in identifying power is mostly driven by lower upper bounds (and to a
lesser degree by higher lower bounds).
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Table 2: Bounds on c2011,2007
N-GARP-based GARP-based
lower upper ∆n lower upper ∆g
∆g−∆n
∆g
mean -0.0368 0.0332 0.0700 -0.0376 0.1064 0.1440 0.4686
std. dev. 0.2878 0.2473 0.1313 0.2878 0.2787 0.1678 0.3913
min -3.0441 -2.4921 0.0000 -3.0441 -2.4888 0.0000 0.0000
25% -0.1199 -0.0417 0.0083 -0.1199 0.0000 0.0417 0.0109
50% -0.0051 0.0072 0.0288 -0.0061 0.0379 0.0936 0.4999
75% 0.0835 0.1310 0.0758 0.0835 0.2547 0.1933 0.8647
max 0.8305 0.8973 2.0989 0.8302 0.8993 2.2848 1.0000
Figure 2: CDF of N-GARP-based bounds Figure 3: CDF of GARP-based bounds
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Better-off and worse-off individuals. As explained in Section 3, we can state that an
individual is better off in 2011 than in 2007 if the lower bound of c2011,2007 (LB) exceeds
zero, while the individual is worse off in 2011 if the upper bound of c2011,2007 (UB) is
below zero. These better-off and worse-off classifications are robust in that they hold
for any specification of the individual utilities that rationalize the observed consumption
behavior. Finally, if the lower and upper bounds have opposite signs (i.e., LB ≤ 0 and
UB ≥ 0), we cannot robustly conclude that the individual is better or worse off in 2011.
Rows 2-4 of Table 3 give the fractions of individuals that are classified as better-off,
worse-off and cannot-say according to our N-GARP-based (column 3) and GARP-based
(column 4) bounds for c2011,2007. In column 5, we report the associated Z-score for tests
of equal proportions in the N-GARP-based and GARP-based categories. Using our N-
GARP-based bounds, we classify 33.19% of our individuals as worse off and 47.86% as
better off, with a residual 18.95% falling in the cannot-say category. By contrast, our
GARP-based bounds classify only 22.36% as worse off and 47.58% as better off, now
leaving 30.06% in the cannot-say category. From our Z-score results, we learn that the
fraction of individuals in the worse-off category is significantly higher in the N-GARP-
based classification than in the GARP-based classification. Correspondingly, the fraction
of individuals in the cannot-say category is significantly lower in the N-GARP-based
classification than in the GARP-based classification. This shows that using normality
assumptions obtains a significantly more informative classification of individuals after
the 2008 crisis. Particularly, the N-GARP restrictions for rational behavior enable a
considerably better identification of the individuals who suffered from a welfare loss after
the 2008 crisis.
Overall, Table 3 provides further support for our earlier conclusion that (mild) nor-
mality assumptions can substantially improve the informative value of nonparametric
welfare analysis. Moreover, our cost of living estimates reveal quite some heterogeneity
across individuals. In Appendix D, we investigate this further by relating these cost of
living estimates to observable individual characteristics. A main finding is that individ-
uals with higher potential incomes in 2007 have been hit more severely by the crisis.11
Next, we also observe that having children correlates significantly with our estimated
welfare effects. At this point, it is worth recalling that our empirical analysis consid-
ers singles who remained employed after the crisis. This contrasts with existing studies,
which mainly focused on the extensive margin of labor supply.
Table 3: Worse-off and better-off individuals
N-GARP GARP Z-score
UB ≤ 0 Worse off in 2011 33.19 22.36 4.53***
LB ≥ 0 Better off in 201 47.86 47.58 0.11
LB ≤ 0 and 0 ≤ UB Cannot-say 18.95 30.06 -4.84***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
11This is mainly driven by the fact that, in our sample, people with higher initial wages suffered from
more severe wage drops after the crisis. See our discussion of Table 12 in Appendix D.
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5 Conclusion
We presented a revealed preference characterization of rational consumer behavior under
the assumption of normal demand. The characterization is easily operationalized in
practice, and it is flexible in that it can impose normality on any subset of goods. We
have also shown the use of our characterization to analyze the welfare effects (in terms of
cost of living indices) of changing price-income regimes. As normality is often a plausible
assumption to make, this provides a useful toolkit to remediate the lack of power that is
frequently associated with empirical revealed preference analysis.
We used our novel methodology to evaluate the welfare impact of the 2008 financial
crisis for individuals situated on the intensive margin of labor supply. Particularly, we
studied the labor supply behavior of a sample of singles drawn from the PSID. Our main
focus was on comparing the goodness-of-fit and identifying power of our nonparametric
characterization of utility maximization, with and without normality assumptions. We
found that the goodness-of-fit results were hardly affected when imposing normality, pro-
viding good empirical support for our normality hypotheses. Next, and more importantly,
we showed that using mild normality assumptions yields a substantially more powerful
empirical welfare analysis: it obtained considerably sharper set identification of individ-
uals’ cost of living indices, and a significantly more informative classification of better-off
and worse-off individuals after the 2008 crisis.
References
Afriat, S. N., 1967. The construction of utility functions from expenditure data. Interna-
tional Economic Review 8 (1), 67–77.
Afriat, S. N., 1973. On a system of inequalities in demand analysis: an extension of the
classical method. International Economic Review, 460–472.
Apesteguia, J., Ballester, M. A., 2015. A measure of rationality and welfare. Journal of
Political Economy 123, 1278–1310.
Banks, J., Blundell, R., Lewbel, A., 1997. Quadratic engel curves and consumer demand.
The Review of Economics and Statistics 79, 527–539.
Blundell, R., Browning, M., Cherchye, L., Crawford, I., De Rock, B., Vermeulen, F.,
2015. Sharp for SARP: Nonparametric bounds on the behavioral and welfare effects of
price changes. American Economic Journal: Microeconomics 7, 43–60.
Blundell, R., Browning, M., Crawford, I., 2007. Improving revealed preference bounds on
demand responses. International Economic Review 48, 1227–1244.
Blundell, R., Browning, M., Crawford, I., 2008. Best nonparametric bounds on demand
responses. Econometrica 76, 1227–1262.
Blundell, R., Pistaferri, L., Saporta-Eksten, I., 2016. Consumption inequality and family
labor supply. The American Economic Review 106, 387–435.
Blundell, R. W., Browning, M., Crawford, I. A., 2003. Nonparametric Engel curves and
revealed preference. Econometrica 71, 205–240.
16
Bronars, S. G., 1987. The power of nonparametric tests of preference maximization.
Econometrica, 693–698.
Browning, M., Chiappori, P.-A., 1998. Efficient intra-household allocations: a general
characterization and empirical tests. Econometrica, 1241–1278.
Cherchye, L., De Rock, B., Vermeulen, F., 2007. The collective model of household
consumption: a nonparametric characterization. Econometrica 75, 553–574.
Cherchye, L., De Rock, B., Vermeulen, F., 2011. The revealed preference approach to
collective consumption behaviour: testing and sharing rule recovery. The Review of
Economic Studies 78, 176–198.
Cherchye, L., Demuynck, T., De Rock, B., 2018. Normality of demand in a two-goods
setting. Journal of Economic Theory 173, 361–382.
Choi, S., Kariv, S., Mu¨ller, W., Silverman, D., 2014. Who is (more) rational? The
American Economic Review 104, 1518–1550.
Christensen, L. R., Jorgenson, D. W., Lau, L. J., 1975. Transcendental logarithmic utility
functions. American Economic Review 65, 367–383.
Dauphin, A., El Lahga, A.-R., Fortin, B., Lacroix, G., 2011. Are children decision-makers
within the household? The Economic Journal 121, 871–903.
Deaton, A., 2011. The financial crisis and the well-being of americans: 2011 OEP Hicks
lecture. Oxford Economic Papers 64, 1–26.
Deaton, A., Muellbauer, J., 1980. An almost ideal demand system. The American Eco-
nomic Review 70, 312–326.
Diewert, W. E., 1973. Afriat and revealed preference theory. The Review of Economic
Studies 40, 419–425.
Fisher, F. M., 1990. Normal goods and the expenditure function. Journal of Economic
Theory 51, 431–433.
Goodman, C. J., Mance, S. M., 2011. Employment loss and the 2007–09 recession: an
overview. Monthly Labor Review 134, 3–12.
Halevy, Y., Persitz, D., Zrill, L., 2018. Parametric recoverability of preferences. Journal
of Political Economy forthcoming.
Houthakker, H. S., 1950. Revealed preference and the utility function. Economica 17,
159–174.
Hurd, M. D., Rohwedder, S., 2010. Effects of the financial crisis and great recession on
american households. Tech. rep., National Bureau of Economic Research.
Nishimura, H., Ok, E. A., Quah, J. K.-H., 2017. A comprehensive approach to revealed
preference theory. The American Economic Review 107, 1239–1263.
Samuelson, P. A., 1938. A note on the pure theory of consumer’s behaviour. Economica
5, 61–71.
17
Samuelson, P. A., 1974. Complementarity: An essay on the 40th anniversary of the hicks-
allen revolution in demand theory. Journal of Economic literature 12, 1255–1289.
Varian, H. R., 1982. The nonparametric approach to demand analysis. Econometrica,
945–973.
Varian, H. R., 1984. The nonparametric approach to production analysis. Econometrica,
579–597.
Varian, H. R., 1990. Goodness-of-fit in optimizing models. Journal of Econometrics 46,
125–140.
Verick, S., 2009. Who is hit hardest during a financial crisis? the vulnerability of young
men and women to unemployment in an economic downturn. Tech. rep.
A Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. We begin by showing necessity of our N-GARP conditions in Definition 5, i.e.
any observed demand originating from utility maximization under normality must satisfy
the conditions in Proposition 2. In a following step, we show sufficiency of the N-GARP
conditions by using the auxiliary results stated in Lemmas 1 and 2 below. For simplicity,
our following proof considers the case where all the goods are normal. The proof for the
case where a strict subset of goods is normal develops directly analogously.
Necessity. Let S = (pt, qt)t∈T be rationalizable under normal demand (on the set M =
{1, ..., n}) by the utility function u : Rn+ → R and expansion paths qt : R+ → Rn+ that
are monotone in x for all goods i.
For all t ∈ T , define ut = u(qt) and, for all t, v ∈ T , define qt,v as the bundle on
the intersection of expansion path qt(x) and the indifference curve through qv. Now, by
definition, we have that the intersection of qt(x) with the indifference curve through qt is
qt. This gives the first N-GARP condition in Definition 5, i.e. qt,t = qt for all t ∈ T .
For the second N-GARP condition, let ut ≥ uv and assume (towards a contradiction)
that prqr,v > prqs,t. This means that qr,vP
Dqs,t and implies that the utility level at
qr,v(= uv) is strictly above the utility level at qs,t(= ut), a contradiction. Thus, we have
prqr,v ≤ prqs,t. We can derive the third N-GARP condition in a directly similar way.
Finally, for the fourth N-GARP condition, we observe that, if ut = u(qt) ≥ uv = u(qv),
then the indifference curve through qv lies below the indifference curve through qt. This
implies that, for any monotone income expansion path qr(x), we have q
i
r,t ≥ qir,v for every
normal good i.
Sufficiency. Suppose the data set S = {(pt, qt)}t∈T is consistent with the N-GARP
conditions in Definition 5 (for the set M = {1, ..., n}). We want to construct a utility
function u : Rn+ → R and expansion paths qt : R+ → Rn+ (which are monotone in x for
each good i) that generate the observed demand.
Let (ut)t∈T be the utility numbers and (qt,v)t,v∈T the bundles that satisfy the N-GARP
restrictions for the given set S. If ut = uv for t 6= v, then for any r ∈ T it is always
possible to remove one of the bundles qr,t or qr,v from the N-GARP conditions such that
the restrictions still hold. Hence, without loss of generality, we can remove the duplicates
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in the set (ut)t∈T for which ut = uv. As such, we obtain a reduced set (ut)t∈R⊆T and
(qt,v)t∈T,v∈R⊆T that satisfy the N-GARP conditions. Now, let us reorder the elements in
R such that u1 < u2 < · · · < u|R|.
As a first step, we construct the income expansion paths qt(x) = q(pt, x), in the
following way (for any x and any t ∈ R):
• If x > ptqt,|R|, then qt(x) = γqt,|R| with γ = xptqt,|R| .
We say that qt(x) is of level |R|+ 1. Observe that ptqt(x) = x.
• If x ≤ ptqt,1, then qt(x) = γqt,1 with γ = xptqt,1 .
We say that qt(x) is of level 1. Again, observe that ptqt(x) = x.
• If ptqt,1 < x ≤ ptqt,|R|, then the ordering of the observations and the fourth condition
of N-GARP imply that there exists a unique v ∈ R such that ptqt,v−1 < x ≤ ptqt,v.
As such, there exists a unique α ∈ (0, 1], such that
x = α(ptqt,v) + (1− α)(ptqt,v−1).
Given this α ∈ (0, 1], define
qt(x) = αqt,v + (1− α)qt,v−1.
In this case, we will say that qt(x) is of level v. Also, ptqt(x) = x.
Observe that the qit(x) are monotone in x for all goods i, continuous and generate the
observed demand by construction.
As a following step, we obtain our result by showing that, for any N ∈ N, any sequence
of income levels x1, x2, · · · , xN and any sequence of observations t1, . . . , tN ∈ T , the set
(pti , qti(xi))i≤N satisfies GARP. Suppose (towards a contradiction) that the result does
not hold. Then, there is a N ∈ N, a sequence x1, x2, · · · , xN of income levels and a
sequence t1, t2, · · · , tN of observations that violate GARP. That is,
pt1qt1(x1) ≥ pt1qt2(x2),
pt2qt2(x2) ≥ pt2qt3(x3),
...
ptN qtN (xN) ≥ ptN qt1(x1),
with at least one strict inequality. From Lemma 1, we know that the level of the bundles
along the cycle cannot increase. Also, it cannot strictly decrease as this would mean
that somewhere along the cycle it must strictly increase. This means that the level of all
bundles should be the same, say r. We distinguish three cases for r:
• If r = |R|+ 1, then there are γ1, . . . , γN such that
qt1(x1) = γ1qt1,R,
qt2(x2) = γ2qt2,R,
. . .
qtN (xN) = γNqtN ,R.
By Lemma 2, we have γ1 ≥ γ2 ≥ · · · ≥ γn ≥ γN ≥ γ1, with at least one strict
inequality, a contradiction.
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• If r = 1, then there are γ1, . . . , γN such that
qt1(x1) = γ1qt1,1,
qt2(x2) = γ2qt2,1,
. . .
qtN (xN) = γNqtN ,1.
Again, by Lemma 2, we have γ1 ≥ γ2 ≥ · · · ≥ γN ≥ γ1, with at least one strict
inequality, a contradiction.
• If 1 < r < |R|+ 1, then there are α1, . . . , αN ∈ (0, 1] such that
qt1(x1) = α1qt1,r + (1− α1)qt1,r−1,
qt2(x2) = α2qt2,r + (1− α2)qt2,r−1,
. . .
qtN (xN) = αNqtN ,r + (1− αN)qtN ,r−1.
By Lemma 2, we have α1 ≥ α2 ≥ · · · ≥ αN ≥ α1, with at least one strict inequality,
a contradiction.
Thus, we conclude that, for any N ∈ N, any sequence x1, x2, · · · , xN of income levels and
any sequence t1, t2, · · · , tN of observations, the set (pti , qti(xi))i≤N satisfies GARP. Then,
Proposition 3 of Nishimura, Ok, and Quah (2017) implies that there exists a continuous
and strictly increasing utility function that rationalizes our constructed expansion paths.
Lemma 1 If ptqt(x) ≥ ptqv(y), then the level of qv(y) is not strictly higher than the level
of qt(x).
Proof of Lemma 1. Let qv(y) be of level r and qt(x) be of level s. Assume (towards a
contradiction) that Lemma 1 does not hold, that is, r > s. Then,
• If r(= |R|+ 1) > s(= 1), then ptqt,1 ≤ ptqv,|R|, so
ptqt(x) ≤ ptqt,1 ≤ ptqv,|R| < ptqv(y),
a contradiction.
• If r(= |R| + 1) > s > 1, then ptqt,s ≤ ptqv,|R| and ptqt,s−1 < ptqv,|R|. As such, if
qt(x) = αqt,s + (1− α)qt,s−1 with α ∈ (0, 1], then
ptqt(x) = α(ptqt,s) + (1− α)(ptqt,s−1) ≤ ptqv,|R| < ptqv(y),
a contradiction.
• If |R| + 1 > r > s = 1, then ptqt,1 ≤ ptqv,r−1 and ptqt,1 < ptqv,r. As such, if
qv(y) = βqv,r + (1− β)qv,r−1 with β ∈ (0, 1], then
ptqt(x) ≤ ptqt,1 < βptqv,r + (1− β)ptqv,r−1 = qv(y).
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• If |R| + 1 > r > s > 1, then ptqt,s ≤ ptqv,r−1, ptqt,s < ptqv,r, ptqt,s−1 < ptqv,r−1 and
ptqt,s−1 < ptqv,r. This implies that any convex combination of ptqt,s and ptqt,s−1
must always be strictly smaller than any convex combination of ptqv,r−1 and ptqv,r.
As such, if qt(x) = αqt,s + (1 − α)qt,s−1 and qv(y) = βqv,r + (1 − β)qv,r−1 with
α, β ∈ (0, 1], then
ptqt(x) = αptqt,s + (1− α)ptqt,s−1
≤ βptqv,r + (1− β)ptqv,r−1 = ptqv(y),
a contradiction.
Lemma 2 Let ptqt(x) ≥ ptqv(y), with the level of qt(x) the same as the level of qv(y).
Then:
• If both qt(x) and qv(y) are of level |R| + 1, and qt(x) = γqt,|R|, qv(y) = δqv,|R|, we
have γ ≥ δ. In addition, if ptqt(x) > ptqv(y), then γ > δ.
• If both qt(x) and qv(y) are of level 1, and qt(x) = γqt,1, qv(y) = δqv,1, we have γ ≥ δ.
In addition, if ptqt(x) > ptqv(y), then γ > δ.
• If both qt(x) and qv(y) are of level r with 1 < r < |R|+ 1, and qt(x) = αqt,r + (1−
α)qt,r−1, qv(y) = βqv,r + (1 − β)qv,r−1 with α, β ∈ (0, 1], then we have α ≥ β. In
addition, if ptqt(x) > ptqv(y), then α > β.
Proof of Lemma 2. We look at the three cases separately:
Suppose that both qt(x) and qv(y) are of level |R| + 1. From the second N-GARP
condition in Definition 5, we know that ptqt,|R| ≤ ptqv,|R|. This implies
δptqv,|R| = ptqv(y)
≤ ptqt(x) = γptqt,|R|
≤ γptqv,|R|.
So, δ ≤ γ with a strict inequality if ptqt(x) > ptqv(y).
Suppose that both qt(x) and qv(y) are of level 1. From the second N-GARP condition
in Definition 5, we know that ptqt,1 ≤ ptqv,1. This implies
δptqv,1 = ptqv(y)
≤ ptqt(x) = γptqt,1
≤ γptqv,1.
So, δ ≤ γ with a strict inequality if ptqt(x) > ptqv(y).
Suppose that both qt(x) and qv(y) are of level r with |R|+1 > r > 1. From the second
N-GARP condition in Definition 5, we know that ptqt,r ≤ ptqv,r and ptqt,r−1 ≤ ptqv,r−1.
As such,
α(ptqt,r) + (1− α)(ptqt,r−1) = ptqt(x)
≥ ptqv(y)
= β(ptqv,r) + (1− β)(ptqv,r−1)
≥ βptqt,r + (1− β)ptqt,r−1.
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This is equivalent to the condition (α − β)(ptqt,r − ptqt,r−1) ≥ 0. The third N-GARP
condition in Definition 5 implies that ptqt,r > ptqt,r−1. As such, it must be that α ≥ β,
with a strict inequality if ptqt(x) > ptqv(y).
B Practical implementation
Mixed integer programming formulation of N-GARP. The N-GARP conditions
in Definition 5 can be reformulated in terms of linear inequalities that are characterized
by (binary) integer variables.
Proposition 3 A data set S = {(pt, qt)}t∈T satisfies the N-GARP conditions in Defini-
tion 5 if and only if there exist binary numbers rt,v ∈ {0, 1} and numbers ut ∈ [0, 1] such
that, for all r, s, t, v, s ∈ T ,
• qt,t = qt,
• ut − uv < rt,v,
• (rv,t − 1) < uv − ut,
• prqr,v − prqs,t < rv,tA,
• A(rt,v − 1) ≤ (prqs,t − prqr,v),
• B(rt,v − 1) ≤ qir,t − qir,v for all i ∈M .
where A is a fixed number greater than any possible value prqr,v(r, v ∈ T ) and B is a fixed
number greater than any qir,v(i ∈M, r, v ∈ T ). By default A and B are finite numbers.
Proof of Proposition 3. Necessity. Assume that the N-GARP conditions in Defini-
tion 5 are satisfied. Let us use the same solution and define rt,v = 1 if and only if ut ≥ uv.
The the first three conditions above are satisfied by default. By the definition of A, the
fourth condition is only binding if rv,t = 0, which means that ut > uv. In this case, Defini-
tion 5 implies that prqr,v < prqs,t and the condition holds. Similarly, the fifth condition is
binding only if rt,v = 1, which implies that ut ≥ uv and thus that prqs,t ≥ prqr,v. Finally,
the last condition only binds if rt,v = 1, which implies that ut ≥ uv, In this case the last
condition of Definition 5 gives qir,v ≤ qir,t. We can thus conclude that the conditions of
Proposition 3 are feasible whenever Definition 5 is satisfied.
Sufficiency. Assume that there exists a solution for the conditions in Proposition 3.
Then we can show that the conditions in Definition 5 are also satisfied for the same solu-
tion. The first condition in Definition 5 is satisfied by default. For the second condition,
if ut ≥ uv then rt,v = 1 by the second condition above and as such the fifth condition
implies that prqs,t ≥ prqr,v. This shows that the second condition of Definition 5 holds.
Next, let ut > uv. If, towards a contradiction, prqr,v ≥ prqs,t, then, by the fourth condition
above, rv,t = 1. This implies, by the third condition, that uv ≥ ut, a contradiction. This
shows that the third condition of Definition 5 holds. For the final condition, let ut ≥ uv.
Then, by the second condition above, rt,v = 1 and, by the last condition, q
i
r,t ≥ qir,v, as
was to be shown.
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Computing the CCEI. The CCEI is found by solving the following optimization
problem:
max e
s.t. 0 ≤ e ≤ 1
∀t ∈ T : 0 ≤ ut ≤ 1
∀t ∈ T : qt,t = qt
∀t, v, r, s ∈ T such that r 6= v : ut ≥ uv → prqr,v ≤ prqs,t
∀t, v, r, s ∈ T such that r 6= v : ut > uv → prqr,v < prqs,t
∀i ∈M,∀t, v, r ∈ T, such that r 6= v : ut ≥ uv → qir,v ≤ qir,t
∀t, v, r, s ∈ T such that r = v : ut ≥ uv → eprqr,v ≤ prqs,t
∀t, v, r, s ∈ T such that r = v : ut > uv → eprqr,v < prqs,t
∀i ∈M,∀t, v, r ∈ T such that r = v : ut ≥ uv → eqir,v ≤ qir,t.
The if–then conditions can be reformulated in terms of linear restrictions with binary
variables, following our reasoning leading up to Proposition 3. As a result, the above op-
timization problem can be reformulated as a mixed integer linear programming problem.
C Data
Table 4 provides a summary of the data set that we use in our empirical application.
As explained in the main text, we assume that the individuals spend their full potential
incomes on four different consumption categories: leisure, food, housing and other goods.
Table 4 reports information on prices, quantities, incomes and some demographics for
our sample of 821 singles. The subscripts 07, 09 and 11 refer to the years 2007, 2009 and
2011, respectively.
We compute leisure quantities by assuming that each individual needs 8 hours per
day for personal care and sleep. Leisure equals the available time that could have been
spent on market work but was not (i.e., leisure per week = (24-8)*7 - market work). Food
expenditures include food at home, delivered and eaten away from home. Housing expen-
ditures include mortgage and loan payments, rent, property tax, insurance, utilities, cable
tv, telephone, internet charges, home repairs and home furnishing. Others expenditures
include health, transportation, education and childcare. We calculate the individuals’
weekly expenditures (i.e., nominal dollars per week) on the three remaining consumption
categories (food, housing and other goods) as the reported annual expenditures divided
by 52.
The price of leisure equals the individual’s hourly wage for market work. The prices of
food, housing and other goods are region-specific consumer price indices that have been
constructed by the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
D Additional empirical results
In this appendix, we first provide several robustness checks of our empirical results dis-
cussed in Section 4 of the main text. These checks largely confirm our principal conclu-
sions. In a following step, we conduct a regression analysis that relates our estimated cost
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Table 4: Summary statistics
mean std. dev. min max
qfood11 0.43 0.27 0.00 1.99
qhouse11 1.20 2.06 0.00 56.28
qother11 0.72 0.66 0.00 6.94
qleisure11 71.35 11.00 16.00 111.00
qfood09 0.41 0.26 0.00 2.13
qhouse09 1.08 0.69 0.00 7.06
qother09 0.82 1.24 0.00 22.86
qleisure09 72.98 10.12 22.00 111.00
qfood07 0.44 0.30 0.00 2.25
qhouse07 1.17 1.38 0.00 22.60
qother07 0.82 0.75 0.00 6.03
qleisure07 70.31 12.15 12.00 105.00
pfood11 226.53 4.00 220.43 233.20
phouse11 213.27 17.03 199.98 248.68
pother11 238.61 2.58 235.89 241.36
pleisure11 20.55 17.58 0.50 180.85
pfood09 217.00 4.35 211.09 224.35
phouse09 211.90 16.48 197.21 243.76
pother09 209.32 3.98 205.15 214.13
pleisure09 19.66 15.32 2.05 165.52
pfood07 201.09 4.44 195.48 207.76
phouse07 204.13 15.99 193.38 236.25
pother07 205.29 2.57 202.62 208.21
pleisure07 16.46 11.95 2.15 149.29
consumption07 1649.61 1070.51 289.31 13231.01
consumption09 1919.21 1294.08 245.85 13179.54
consumption11 1973.16 1442.99 181.25 13235.89
fullincome07 1842.97 1338.09 240.80 16720.48
fullincome09 2202.09 1715.59 229.60 18538.24
fullincome11 2301.66 1968.76 56.00 20255.20
nonlabor07 -193.36 513.20 -3489.47 4213.92
nonlabor09 -282.88 617.01 -5358.70 4887.96
nonlabor11 -328.50 802.93 -7999.98 10699.09
age07 37.95 13.38 18.00 81.00
male 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00
homeowner07 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
have children07 0.31 0.46 0.00 1.00
number. of children07 0.54 0.96 0.00 6.00
years of education07 13.53 2.10 6.00 17.00
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of living indices to observable individual characteristics. This provides an (exploratory)
investigation of who has been affected by the 2008 crisis.
Cost of living indices. As a first robustness check, Table 5 summarizes our N-GARP-
based and GARP-based estimated bounds on c2011,2007 for the 584 individuals whose be-
havior is exactly rationalizable under normal demand (i.e., N-GARP-based CCEI equals
1). We observe that the results are closely similar to the ones contained in Table 2 in the
main text.
Next, Table 6 reports summary statistics for the estimated bounds on c2011,2007 when
assuming normality of all four consumption categories (food, housing, other goods and
leisure). Similar to Table 5, we focus on the (415) individuals that are exactly ratio-
nalizable under these normality assumptions (i.e., N-GARP-based CCEI equals 1). We
calculate three types of bounds for this sample of individuals: N-GARP-I bounds, which
exploit normality for all four consumption categories, N-GARP-II bounds, which (only)
exploit normality for the three categories food, housing and other goods (as in our main
exercise), and GARP bounds, which do not use any normality assumption. As can be
expected, the N-GARP-I bounds are tighter than the N-GARP-II bounds, and these N-
GARP-II bounds are tighter than the GARP bounds. The relative improvement of the
N-GARP-I bounds over the N-GARP-II and GARP bounds is quite substantial, which
shows the empirical bite of the assumption that leisure is normal.
Table 5: Bounds on c2011,2007 for individuals with N-GARP-based CCEI = 1
N-GARP-based GARP-based
min max ∆n min max ∆g
∆g−∆n
∆g
mean -0.0483 0.0292 0.0775 -0.0491 0.0987 0.1479 0.4232
std. dev. 0.3084 0.2630 0.1382 0.3084 0.2928 0.1761 0.3789
min -3.0441 -2.4921 0.0003 -3.0441 -2.4888 0.0013 0.0000
25% -0.1278 -0.0492 0.0123 -0.1300 0.0000 0.0419 0.0000
50% -0.0122 0.0000 0.0349 -0.0123 0.0000 0.0947 0.4008
75% 0.0820 0.1363 0.0852 0.0820 0.2492 0.1943 0.8182
max 0.8305 0.8973 2.0989 0.8302 0.8993 2.2848 0.9978
Table 6: N-GARP-I, N-GARP-II and GARP bounds on c2011,2007
N-GARP-I N-GARP-II GARP
min max ∆n1 min max ∆n2 min max ∆g
∆g−∆n1
∆g
∆g−∆n2
∆g
mean -0.052 0.000 0.052 -0.053 0.030 0.082 -0.054 0.112 0.166 0.721 0.471
std. dev. 0.284 0.230 0.133 0.286 0.217 0.155 0.286 0.254 0.193 0.243 0.378
min -3.044 -0.945 0.000 -3.044 -0.945 0.000 -3.044 -0.792 0.002 0.000 0.000
25% -0.157 -0.099 0.006 -0.157 -0.051 0.011 -0.163 0.000 0.049 0.588 0.035
50% -0.012 -0.002 0.018 -0.012 0.000 0.037 -0.012 0.000 0.110 0.793 0.516
75% 0.081 0.114 0.053 0.079 0.132 0.086 0.078 0.277 0.211 0.915 0.845
max 0.659 0.897 2.099 0.659 0.897 2.099 0.659 0.899 2.285 0.999 0.998
Better-off and worse-off individuals. As a following robustness check of our re-
sults in Section 4, we consider the classification of worse-off, better-off and cannot-say
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individuals for two alternative scenarios: the first scenario uses the N-GARP-based and
GARP-based classifications for the 584 individuals of which the N-GARP-based CCEI
equals 1 (also included in Table 5); the second scenario uses the GARP-based classifica-
tion for the 782 individuals whose behavior is exactly rationalizable when not imposing
normality on any good (i.e., GARP-based CCEI equals 1).
The results for the two scenarios are summarized in Table 7. Comfortingly, we find
that the results in Table 7 are generally close to the ones in Table 3 that we discuss in
the main text. Again, it suggests that our main qualitative conclusions are robust.
N-GARP-CCEI=1 GARP-CCEI=1
(584 individuals) (782 individuals)
N-GARP GARP GARP
UB ≤ 0 Worse off in 2011 33.56 22.6 22.38
LB ≥ 0 Better off in 2011 45.21 45.03 48.59
LB ≤ 0 and 0 ≤ UB Cannot-say 21.23 32.36 29.03
Table 7: Worse-off and better-off individuals for individuals with N-GARP-based
CCEI=1 and GARP-based CCEI=1
Four PSID waves: 2007, 2009, 2011 and 2013. Next, we check robustness of our
main findings for a longer panel containing four consumption observations per individual
(adding the 2013 PSID wave to our original data set). The following Tables 8, 9 and 10
have a directly analogous interpretation as the Tables 1, 2 and 3 that we discussed in the
main text.
Generally, we can conclude that the results in Tables 8, 9 and 10 are fairly close to
those in Tables 1, 2 and 3. For our application, adding a consumption observation (i.e.,
PSID wave) per individual only moderately affects our goodness-of-fit and cost of living
results.
Table 8: Critical Cost Efficiency Index (CCEI); 4 waves
N-GARP GARP
CCEI=1 368 (53.18%) 630 (91.04%)
CCEI ≥ 0.99 493 (71.24%) 665 (96.10%)
mean 0.9779 0.9975
std. dev. 0.0520 0.0160
min 0.6235 0.7456
25% 0.9849 1.0000
50% 1.0000 1.0000
75% 1.0000 1.0000
max 1.0000 1.0000
Who is affected by the crisis ? Generally, our cost of living estimates reveal quite
some heterogeneity across individuals. In what follows, we investigate this further by
relating the N-GARP-based cost of living estimates to observable individual characteris-
tics. This can provide additional insight into which types of individuals (on the intensive
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Table 9: Bounds on c2011,2007; 4 waves
N-GARP GARP
min max ∆n min max ∆g
∆g−∆n
∆g
mean -0.0715 0.0157 0.0872 -0.0730 0.0813 0.1543 0.4392
std. dev. 0.5201 0.2794 0.4051 0.5200 0.3014 0.4416 0.4422
min -9.4503 -2.5142 0.0000 -9.4503 -2.4888 0.0000 -4.4851
25% -0.1257 -0.0651 0.0080 -0.1260 -0.0094 0.0341 0.0363
50% -0.0108 0.0007 0.0292 -0.0118 0.0000 0.0822 0.4481
75% 0.0806 0.1218 0.0764 0.0784 0.2254 0.1954 0.8285
max 0.8306 0.8378 8.7351 0.8303 0.8993 9.3705 1.0000
Table 10: Worse-off and better-off individuals; 4 waves
classification by bounds of: N-GARP GARP
UB ≤ 0 Worse off in 2011 38.74 27.59
LB ≥ 0 Better off in 2011 46.45 45.44
LB ≤ 0 and 0 ≤ UB Cannot-say 14.81 26.98
margin of labor supply) were particularly hit by the crisis. We conduct three regression
exercises: our first exercise uses interval regression and explicitly takes the (difference
between) lower and upper bounds into account, our second exercise is a simple OLS
regression that uses the average of the lower and upper bounds as the dependent vari-
able, and our last exercise is a logit regression that explains the probability of being
better-off (versus worse-off) after the 2008 crisis (using our N-GARP-based classification
as worse-off or better-off to define the dependent variable). Further, to distinguish be-
tween short-run and longer-run effects of the crisis, we ran our regressions for two cost
of living indices: c2009,2007 (capturing the short run effect) and c2011,2007 (capturing the
longer run effect). We use the N-GARP-based bound estimates for the 702 individuals
with a CCEI-value at least equal to 0.99 (with c2011,2007-values summarized in Table 3).
Table 11 summarizes our findings. We see that individuals with higher labor incomes
(i.e., wages) and nonlabor incomes are generally associated with lower cost of living
indices, and are less likely to be better off in both the short run and the longer run when
compared to their pre-crisis utility level. Next, while we find no significant short run
effect related to region of residence (captured by the dummy variables North Central,
South and West, using North East as the reference category) or industry (captured by
the dummy variables construction and services), we do see that individuals residing in
the West region are generally worse off in the longer run, while the opposite holds true
for individuals working in the service sector.
Next, we observe that many individual characteristics that are statistically significant
in the short run become insignificant in the longer run. For example, homeowners and
single parents are better off than non-home owners and childless singles in the short
run. However, these effects fade out in the longer run. Similarly, being a single male
parent corresponds to a significantly negative crisis effect in the short run, but this effect
disappears in the longer run.
Table 12 shows pairwise correlation coefficients between wages in 2007 and relative
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Table 11: Welfare effects and individual characteristics
interval simple OLS Logit
c2009,2007 c2011,07 c2009,2007 c2011,2007 c2009,2007 c2011,2007
fullincome07 -0.000107*** -0.000115*** -0.000109*** -0.000118*** -0.00118*** -0.00136***
(1.35e-05) (1.53e-05) (1.41e-05) (1.62e-05) (0.000199) (0.000320)
nonlabor07 -0.000362*** -0.000420*** -0.000371*** -0.000428*** -0.00416*** -0.00454***
(4.54e-05) (5.28e-05) (4.72e-05) (5.40e-05) (0.000739) (0.000823)
years of education07 0.00298 0.00245 0.00266 0.00296 0.0642 -0.0162
(0.00411) (0.00450) (0.00423) (0.00475) (0.0600) (0.0671)
North Central -0.0247 -0.0340 -0.0215 -0.0333 -0.426 -0.916**
(0.0267) (0.0222) (0.0277) (0.0232) (0.420) (0.450)
South -0.00914 -0.00821 -0.00946 -0.00885 -0.202 -0.753*
(0.0253) (0.0206) (0.0263) (0.0218) (0.389) (0.430)
West -0.0322 -0.0662** -0.0301 -0.0615** -0.686 -1.269***
(0.0289) (0.0266) (0.0300) (0.0275) (0.441) (0.468)
homeowner07 0.0312** 0.0156 0.0324** 0.0196 0.360 0.262
(0.0154) (0.0159) (0.0162) (0.0174) (0.255) (0.264)
male 0.0153 0.000816 0.0155 0.00113 0.0334 -0.209
(0.0168) (0.0168) (0.0177) (0.0176) (0.276) (0.276)
have child07 0.0647*** 0.0371* 0.0665*** 0.0332 0.872*** 0.272
(0.0178) (0.0198) (0.0184) (0.0212) (0.297) (0.294)
male*have child07 -0.145*** -0.000880 -0.145*** 0.00703 -1.769** -0.278
(0.0455) (0.0612) (0.0459) (0.0618) (0.880) (0.945)
age07 0.000837 -0.000611 0.000899 -0.000643 0.00973 -0.0109
(0.000692) (0.000582) (0.000710) (0.000605) (0.00919) (0.00900)
construction07 -0.00392 -0.0141 -0.000317 -0.00615 -0.350 -0.115
(0.0228) (0.0294) (0.0236) (0.0307) (0.423) (0.396)
services07 0.0227 0.0295* 0.0251 0.0355** 0.0211 0.246
(0.0154) (0.0154) (0.0161) (0.0179) (0.238) (0.250)
constant 0.0416 0.114 0.0412 0.103 0.605 3.116***
(0.0646) (0.0694) (0.0670) (0.0737) (1.009) (1.011)
observations 628 628 628 628 476 453
R-squared 0.415 0.437
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 12: Pairwise correlation coefficients (significant: in bold)
a b c d e f g
wage in 2007 a 1
relative increase in wage b -0.2296 1
0
relative increase in leisure hours c -0.0298 0.0782 1
0.4303 0.0383
relative increase in leisure expenditures d -0.1761 0.9002 0.3932 1
0 0 0
relative increase in food expenditures e -0.0556 0.0487 0.0159 0.0376 1
0.144 0.2008 0.6765 0.3232
relative increase in house expenditures f -0.0429 0.0205 0.0357 0.0182 0.0195 1
0.2572 0.5883 0.3457 0.6301 0.609
relative increase in other expenditures g -0.0669 0.0146 0.0236 0.0147 0.0553 0.0129 1
0.0789 0.7016 0.5352 0.7003 0.149 0.7356
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changes in wages, leisure hours, expenditures on leisure, expenditures on food, housing
expenditures and other expenditures (measuring the relative change in variable y as
y11−y07
y07
). We see that people with higher initial wages (in 2007) generally experienced
larger wage drops (and thus income drops) than people with lower initial wages. This
explains the negative regression coefficient for the initial full income in Table 11: if a
higher initial potential income corresponds to a greater loss in total income, it is also
associated with a more pronounced utility loss.
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